W e contrast life-cycle and path-dependent views of entrepreneurial firms by examining the evolution of top management teams. We show how initial conditions constrain subsequent outcomes by demonstrating that the founding team's prior functional experiences and initial organizational functional structures predict subsequent top manager backgrounds and later functional structures. We find that narrowly experienced teams have trouble adding functional expertise not already embodied in the team. We also find that firms beginning with a limited range of functional positions are less likely to develop complete functional structures. Importantly, we do not find functional structure and functional experience to be interchangeable. We find that firms beginning with more complete functional structures are likely to go public faster, and firms beginning with broadly experienced team members obtain venture capital more quickly regardless of the experience and structural composition of the top management team in place at the time of these outcomes. Further, broadly experienced founding teams that build an early team with a full complement of functional positions achieve important milestones faster than firms that start with neither experience nor structure. This suggests that creating positions as "placeholders" in new ventures, where positions are created and filled with the intent of bringing individuals with more relevant experience onboard later, is not obviously a path by which to succeed. By examining the origins of top management team experience and functional structures, we illustrate the lasting imprint of founders on top management team composition and firm outcomes.
Introduction
The popular press often portrays successful high-technology firms being launched by specialized technological geniuses: Brilliant scientists found a company (frequently in a garage), then attract more broadly experienced executives and venture capital to bring the firm to the next level (Audia and Rider 2005) . A similar view is taken by entrepreneurship scholars who take a lifecycle perspective (e.g., Greiner 1972) : Executives are replaced as the firm outgrows their capabilities in a process of "professionalization" (Hellman and Puri 2002, Boeker and Karachalil 2002) . Our research examines the extent to which these images reflect reality. There is broad consensus that successful firms are led by seasoned professional managers who bring a full range of skills to the venture (Roberts 1991 , Cooper et al. 1994 , Burton et al. 2002 and create an organization of functional structure with clear roles and accountability (Ancona and Caldwell 1992 , Keck 1997 , Roure and Keeley 1990 , Jensen and Zajac 2004 , Sine et al. 2006 ). Yet we know relatively little about how teams and firms evolve over time.
Although many pundits explicitly recommend that entrepreneurial firms replace founders with professional managers (Charan et al. 1980 , Flamholtz and Randle 2000 , Wasserman 2003 , it is less clear how a new firm founded by narrowly experienced technologists in an undifferentiated functional structure is able to attract broadly experienced team members and develop a broad portfolio of functional positions. In fact, much of the extant organizational literature that emphasizes homophily (McPherson et al. 2001 , Ruef et al. 2003 , imprinting (Boeker 1988, Burton and , and inertia , Phillips 2005 suggests that this kind of professionalization and organizational evolution would be both difficult and unlikely.
In this paper we explore how the breadth of founder prior experiences and early decisions about functional structures influence the types of executives who are attracted and retained and the types of structures that are subsequently put into place. We contrast the life-cycle perspective with a path-dependent view of firm development. We argue that, contrary to the images of the popular press and life-cycle theories of entrepreneurial firm development, homophily and imprinting operate such that subsequent executives and structures bear a strong resemblance to founding executives and structures. Our research extends the idea that founders bring important experiences and make critical choices early in a firm's history that leave a lasting organizational imprint.
Building on established traditions in top management team demography and upper echelon literatures, we examine two facets of the team: the breadth and depth of the position assignments in the new venture and the prior experiences that team members bring to the firm (Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2002) . We conceptualize prior functional experience as a measure of the team's human capital (whether someone has prior sales or engineering experience, for example) and functional assignments as a measure of functional structure distinct from the skills and qualifications of any specific incumbent (whether a firm has a vice president of sales or engineering, for example).
Interestingly, although the extant literature recognizes both structural and human capital differences among nascent ventures, they are rarely considered simultaneously. Instead, scholars interested in functional structure tend to ignore the characteristics of the individuals who occupy structural positions (e.g., Roure and Keeley 1990, Sine et al. 2006) , and scholars interested in teams and individuals tend to ignore structure (e.g., Cooper et al. 1994) . Indeed, in much of the top management team (TMT) demography research, functional structure, and experiences are considered interchangeable (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell 1992, Keck 1997) .
Treating structure and experience as conceptual and empirical equivalents may be reasonable in established organizations, where we expect to see team members with relevant experience in a position (e.g., a person with a sales background in a sales job). In entrepreneurial ventures, however, there may or may not be a match between prior functional experience and current functional assignment. Consider the technologist with no management experience who takes on the role of president, the sales person who is responsible for human resource management or customer service, and the recent business school graduate with prior engineering experience who fulfills the business development or marketing function. This potential for a mismatch between prior experience and structural assignment offers a compelling arena in which to compare life-cycle and path-dependent perspectives. Whereas life-cycle models advocate that firms create positions as "placeholders" until executives with the relevant experience can be hired and the firm can be professionalized Puri 2002, Boeker and Wiltbank 2005) , pathdependent models would be more cautionary, given the potential dangers of functional structures filled by individuals with atypical experience . In sum, we argue that functional experience and functional structure are distinct, and we explore their interrelationships and their effects on firm outcomes.
Theory and Hypotheses
Prior experience of the top manager and the functional structure of a firm have long been of interest in the TMT demography (Pfeffer 1983 ) and upper echelons literatures (Hambrick and Mason 1984) . A relatively large body of empirical research confirms the intriguing and sensible possibility that the demographic composition of TMTs has consequences for organizational strategy and performance (see Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996 and Williams and O'Reilly 1998 for reviews) .
A large number of studies have focused on functional diversity and demonstrated a relationship among top manager functional diversity and a variety of outcomes including firm performance, reorientation, and external communication (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990 , Ancona and Caldwell 1992 , Lant et al. 1992 . When theorists posit a positive main effect of functional diversity, they generally argue that diversity enhances organizational performance because broad functional representation ensures that the TMT has the full range of capabilities needed to manage the organization (e.g., Keck 1997, Randel and Jaussi 2003) . Although the mainstream demography literature has advanced to identify a variety of process variables that account for the relationship between diversity and outcomes (e.g., Smith et al. 1994) , as well as a host of factors that moderate the relationship between diversity and outcomes (e.g., Jehn et al. 1999) , an important conceptual distinction between functional experience and functional structure has been largely ignored. The literature has generally used the same logic to account for diverse functional structures and diverse functional experiences, treating these dimensions as interchangeable and considering the choice of measuring structure or experience a methodological detail (but see Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2002 for an exception).
Functional structure refers to the existence of functional roles or positions irrespective of any person who might occupy the role, but functional experience refers to the human capital characteristics of the individual incumbents. This distinction is theoretically interesting, as it allows us to consider team evolution from both a structural perspective and a human capital/social psychological perspective. If structure and experience are distinct and separable constructs, each should have a unique effect on firm outcomes. Structure and experience may also evolve through different paths, or one may be antecedent to the other. Our research considers these possibilities and extends the existing empirical and theoretical literatures by distinguishing functional experience from functional structure. Our work contributes to the small but growing number of studies that are longitudinal by design (Boone et al. 2004 , Sørensen 2004 , and so can also respond to calls to explore the sources of demographic distributions in organizations (Mittman 1992 , Lawrence 1997 , Carroll and Harrison 1998 and address why TMTs "look the way they do" (Hambrick 2007, p. 338) .
We address Hambrick's call by examining the role of the founding team in creating the experiences and structure of the subsequent TMT. If path dependence occurs, then initial functional structures will predict a deepening of these structures over time. If homophily occurs, then initial functional experiences will predict a deepening of these experiences over time. If functional structure and functional experience are interchangeable, then having either will enable a firm to broaden as it evolves. Furthermore, we examine whether these initial characteristics of the team and firm have lasting consequences. If, as lifecycle theories predict, initial functional structures and experiences are irrelevant to subsequent changes, then there should be little relationship between the founding team experiences and structures and subsequent experiences and structures, particularly as founders are replaced and firms mature. Thus, in stark contrast to a pathdependent perspective, where origins are a source of subsequent constraint, the life-cycle perspective emphasizes opportunity and adaptation.
In summary, we consider five interrelated questions: (1) whether the functional experience of the founders shapes initial decisions about functional structure, (2) whether the initial functional structure constrains future functional structure, (3) whether the initial functional structure shapes the functional experience of executives hired by the firm, (4) whether the functional experience of the founders influences the experiences of executives who join subsequently; and (5) whether the initial functional structure and experiences shape firm outcomes.
To examine these questions, it is important to first distinguish between the founding team and TMT. Founding teams are made up of people who create the firm, irrespective of whether they hold executive titles. For example, a founder may hold a position of "director of engineering" rather than vice president. TMTs are made up of people who hold executive titles, regardless of when they join the firm. Although there is overlap between these teams at founding if all founders hold executive titles, the teams are conceptually and empirically distinct. Founders are not added as the firm grows, and, as TMT members join the firm and founders leave, the teams continue to diverge.
Our first question about the relationship between prior functional background experience and initial functional structural decisions draws on two ideas-that functional background experiences shape a person's world view and that people carry their prior experiences with them across organizational settings. We rely on early statements and recent empirical evidence suggesting that functional training conditions individual cognitions (Dearborn and Simon 1958 , Sutcliffe 1994 , Tripsas and Gavetti 2000 and an established empirical tradition demonstrating that when employees leave an organization, they carry that organization's routines and ideas with them (Baty et al. 1971 , Boeker 1997 , Sørensen 1999 , Phillips 2002 . For example, the functional experience and strategy of the founder's prior firm influences the strategy of the new firm (Boeker 1988) , and founders' experiences in a prior firm shape the routines and practices they put in place in a new firm (Phillips 2005 , Beckman 2006 ). In addition, there is growing evidence that the functional background experiences of a TMT influence how it defines and enacts organizational positions (Fligstein 1990 , Phillips 2005 . Extending this idea to initial decisions about the allocation of positions and responsibilities, we hypothesize that founders will put functional structures in place that mirror their own experiences (Schein 1992, Burton and . For example, a founding team with a member from a sales and business planning background may decide to combine the sales and business planning functions under a single executive and build an organization where these functions are closely interrelated and externally (customer) oriented. The background of the initial marketing executive-business development, classical marketing, or sales-leads to different choices about what the marketing function does and with which other functions it is aligned. Thus we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Founding team functional experience will shape initial functional structure.
Once the initial functional structures are put into place in an organization, they are likely to be maintained and strengthened over time. Support for this argument comes from several theoretical traditions. Social theorists have long argued that institutions are selfreinforcing (Michels 1915 , Downs 1967 . In addition, theories of organizational imprinting suggest that initial decisions about the allocation of responsibility among team members have lasting consequences (Stinchcombe 1965 , Burton et al. 2002 . For example, Baron et al. (1999) find that founding organizational blueprints, around which employment relations are managed, predict subsequently adopted decisions and structures (including adding new functional positions; creating formal documentation and organizational charts). Finally, arguments of structural inertia suggest that initial structures will be maintained over time (Hannan and Freeman 1984) . Thus, a range of work suggests that initial functional structures predict later functional structures. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Founding functional structure will shape the breadth and depth of subsequent functional structure.
Founding functional structure will also likely shape subsequent management functional experience. Extensive literature on job analysis-which in modern human resource management is the foundation of job descriptions, job design and redesign, performance appraisal, selection, and training-defines jobs as combinations of tasks that require particular knowledge, skills, and abilities that can be generically specified (cf. Fine and Cronshaw 1999) . Indeed, the extensive literature on organizational design, formalization, and even internal labor INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
markets has a vision of clearly defined and hierarchically ordered positions or roles (see Osterman and Burton 2004 for a recent review). Jobs exist in organizations as "placeholders" against which individuals in the labor market can be matched (e.g., Wanous 1992; see Miner 1987 for a review of this literature and an alternative view). Similarly, these characterizations of roles, jobs, and positions imply that the organizational functional structure shapes the characteristics of subsequent incumbents.
Consider again the firm in which sales and business planning positions are closely aligned. When a new executive is recruited to take over the combined position, the structure of the position will influence the choice of executive for the position. A different founding team might decide to create stand-alone sales and business planning functions, which would lead to different future candidates. Thus, the structural choices made by the founding team have implications for the characteristics of the subsequent executives who would be capable of filling the defined positions, attracted to the opportunity, and attractive to the incumbent team members. Our arguments imply that structural decisions made by firm founders constrain the pool of people who might be willing or able to join the firm. Thus we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Founding functional structure will shape the breadth and depth of subsequent functional experience.
Finally, there are reasons to expect an association between the prior functional experiences of the founding team and subsequent TMT experience. Several mechanisms (which may operate simultaneously) could generate this path dependence. For instance, the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) cycle described by Schneider (1987) would predict that founding and future TMTs will share similar characteristics. Managers seek organizations where existing personnel have similar characteristics, founders select managers like themselves, and managers who do not fit will leave. For example, Boone et al. (2004) find that even when environmental conditions shifted dramatically, Dutch newspaper executives tended to hire new executives who were demographically similar to those already in place. Thus, founders and managers alike should be attracted to one another when they share common experiences and knowledge.
A large literature on homophily (Rogers and Bhowmik 1971, Ruef et al. 2003 ) also suggests this relationship. Although research on homophily has generally focused on categories such as race and gender, there is growing evidence that the same processes apply to occupations (McPherson et al. 2001) . Founders may privilege and recruit executives with functional experiences similar to their own rather than executives with functional experience that may be more relevant for the position being filled. For example, engineers might prefer a CEO with a technical background over one with a finance background. It is important to note that these tendencies toward functional homophily within a position may result in team-level functional heterogeneity. Teams will be functionally diverse if, for instance, individual preferences for homophily exist on founding teams where members come from a variety of functional backgrounds. Alternately, founders with diverse functional backgrounds (functional generalists) may value that variety and seek TMT members who themselves have diverse experiences. Thus, at the team level, homophily and similarity-attraction arguments imply similarity between the experiences of the founding team and the experiences of the TMT. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Founding team functional experience will shape the breadth and depth of subsequent TMT functional experience.
Following a path-dependent logic, our hypotheses suggest a tight linkage between initial team experiences/ structures and subsequent TMT experiences/structures. Importantly, this implies there will be relatively little change in functional structure or human capital experience from the founding team to later teams. Thus, in sharp contrast to the dominant image of narrowly experienced engineers in an unstructured nascent venture who are replaced by professionals who evolve the firm into a professional bureaucracy, our hypotheses imply that initial founding team characteristics and structural choices should be a powerful predictor of later experiences and structures-even controlling for compositional changes. Contrary to a life-cycle perspective that would be agnostic about initial conditions, our theoretical arguments imply that initial conditions restrict subsequent firm and team options.
To further understand the lasting consequences of these initial conditions, we also directly link founding experiences and structures to firm outcomes. Both the entrepreneurship and TMT literatures offer ample evidence linking human capital characteristics such as the type and amount of prior experience to firm success (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986 , Roberts 1991 , Cooper et al. 1994 ). Other work finds that a range of prior experiences as well as shared experiences benefit the firm Schoonhoven 1990, Beckman et al. 2007) . Still other work links the functional structure of the firm to firm outcomes (Ancona and Caldwell 1992 , Keck 1997 , Roure and Keeley 1990 . More recently, Sine et al. (2006) demonstrate that formalized functional positions and functional specialization is positively associated with firm success in a sample of Internet start-ups. Together these studies document that a broad set of both team functional experiences and functional structures are predictive of firm outcomes. Thus, we hypothesize: Interestingly, the existing literature is silent as to whether structure might be more important to firm success than experience or vice versa. If the structure and experience are distinct conceptual constructs, then they should have independent effects. If, as the extant demography literature has implied, structure and experience are interchangeable representations of the same underlying construct, then having either broad functional experience represented among the founding team members or a differentiated functional structure should be sufficient to fuel the development of a firm with a broadly experienced TMT and a differentiated functional structure. However, if structure and experience are not interchangeable, then an increase on one dimension cannot compensate for a weakness on another dimension. Our analyses explore these alternatives.
If, as we posit, the founding conditions set teams and firms on a particular path, then cross-sectional studies of TMTs overattribute outcomes to the current team and overestimate the extent to which teams can be reformed. We pursue a research strategy that begins with the founding team and then tracks changes in personnel-both through entrances and exits-and in functional composition to explore exactly how the founding team and initial structures shape the subsequent TMT and later structures.
Data and Methods
This paper begins with a sample of entrepreneurial hightechnology firms in California's Silicon Valley that were studied as part of the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC) (see Baron et al. 1999 for a detailed description) but includes additional data on individual executives. The focus on firms in a single region allows us to hold constant key labor market and environmental conditions. Within the region, the SPEC study focuses on the high-technology industries of computer hardware and/or software, telecommunications, medical devices and biotechnology, semiconductors, manufacturing, and research. The sampling frame explicitly oversamples young and small firms. The firms in the sample have at least 10 employees and are no more than 10 years old at the time data collection begins in 1994-1996. About half of the firms are founded before 1989, and thus the median age of the firms in 1994 is five years. Our sample is not representative of all start-up firms in that we have fewer solo founders and more teams of three or more founders, but this is typical of high-technology start-ups Schoonhoven 1990, Ruef et al. 2003) . Our sampling frame has the disadvantage of biasing the sample toward firms that have survived several years and thus are more likely to be (or become) successful. That said, we sample firms that both do and do not receive venture funding and go public. We see no a priori reason to expect that our hypothesized effects, where TMTs are constrained and shaped by founding teams, will be different for a broader sample of start-up firms.
The key independent and dependent variables for this study are constructed from career histories. We construct a monthly database of every founder and every executive that ever worked for one of the sampled firms from founding through December 2000 or the time of initial public offering (IPO), acquisition, or failure (see below). The founding team was identified in an interview with the founder (the mean founding team has 2.82 members), and all subsequent TMT members are identified as those individuals ranked as vice president or higher (e.g., senior vice president, CTO, CIO, COO). It is important to note that founders do not always hold TMT titles (as evidenced by an average TMT smaller than the founding team at time zero). Our data sources include interviews (conducted in 1994-1995 and 1996-1997) , internal company documents (business plans and promotional documents), Lexis/Nexis news searches, Dow Jones Interactive, Edgar Archives (useful for firms about to go public and for top managers who have been involved with public companies), The San Jose Mercury News (the local paper has a regular column on promotions, movements, and resignations in the Silicon Valley), and extensive Web searches. Over a six-year period we completed at least four complete searches for each person and spent thousands of person-hours collecting career data on team members. We confirmed, via interview or telephone, nearly 50% of the career histories collected through 1996-1997 with the person designated by the CEO or the human resources person. This increases the reliability of the earliest team data, the most difficult period to gather consistent data through archival sources.
Despite extensive research, we do not obtain complete career histories on all team members. Often the chronology of careers is correct but the dates unclear. This data problem precludes us from constructing duration variables such as years of experience in a particular function, a method commonly pursued by demography scholars. Because some of our team data may be incomplete, we make a point to control for variables that may impact the completeness of the data (i.e., firm size) as well as the average amount of person data collected by firm.
Our final database contains information on 1,485 executives in 167 firms holding 1,940 positions in our sampled firms. We collect a median of two past positions for each person, including employer identity and job title, with a maximum of 19 positions for a single person, although we limit our analysis to the prior three employers. This includes data for executives (often founders) who we confirm had no prior work experience (at least 38 founders join one of our firms directly from school). For Hypotheses 1-4 and our analysis of team evolution we rely on our full sample (167 firms). For our analysis of outcomes, firms that are not independent (e.g., wholly owned subsidiaries) or at risk of going public (e.g., nonprofit research centers) are excluded (resulting in a sample of 158 firms for our outcome analysis).
Dependent Variables
In this research we examine three types of dependent variables: (1) functional organizational structure, (2) team member functional experience, and (3) firm outcomes. The difference between functional structure and team functional experience mirrors the difference between functional assignment diversity and functional background diversity in the demography literature (Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2002) .
Functional organizational structure is measured as whether the firm has defined executive-level positions in each of the following six functional areas: sales and marketing, general administration (including human resources), science/R&D/engineering, operations, business development/strategic planning, and finance/accounting. For each firm, we calculate whether a firm has a given functional position, when it is first established, and how many executive-level positions in a given function simultaneously exist in a team for each month of the firm's life. For example, a technologyintensive firm may be founded with a CTO and a vice president of engineering. The vice president of engineering job is later transformed into the position of senior vice president of engineering, and a vice president of hardware and a vice president of software are hired. This firm clearly has a science/R&D/engineering function. It is established at age 0 and there are ultimately four executive-level positions in this function on the TMT.
We also create a count measure ranging from 0 to 6 that represents the number of functional categories covered each month to predict the breadth of functional structure. Firms with no executive positions are coded 0 for structure; firms with executive positions for all six functions are coded six.
Prior functional experience of TMT members is gathered from career histories. We code up to three prior positions for every individual into one of the six functional areas (see above). From team-level career histories we calculate a variable, updated monthly, indicating how many team members have prior experience in a function to capture the depth of functional experience on a team.
We also create a count measure ranging from 0 to 6 that represents the range of prior functional experience brought by the team in each month and that thus captures the breadth of functional experience. A six indicates that all possible functions are represented in the prior experiences of the team.
We have two firm outcome measures: time to receive venture capital (VC) and time to IPO, and we conduct event-history analyses to examine these outcomes. These firm outcomes represent the most significant milestones in the life of a young start-up (Shane and Stuart 2002) , particularly during the time period and in the region that we study. We focus on time to first VC funding rather than cumulative rounds or total funds raised, because future rounds are based on more direct knowledge about the firm than the first VC financing, and amount is a firm and industry-specific choice (Gompers and Lerner 1999) . By modeling time to first VC funding, we examine characteristics of the team that allowed the firm to obtain funding more quickly than other firms, as well as whether they receive VC backing. By choosing IPO as our second dependent variable, we can compare the performance of entrepreneurial firms across multiple industries-a task that is quite difficult using accounting-based measures of profitability. Recent studies have examined IPO as an outcome variable indicating firm success (Stuart et al. 1999 , Certo et al. 2001 , Gulati and Higgins 2003 , Shane and Stuart 2002 , Hannan et al. 2006 . This IPO measure also allows us to examine a firm outcome that occurs over a longer time horizon than initial VC funding. VC financing and IPO data are collected via public and proprietary databases (such as Venture One and Venture Economics), government filings, annual reports, internal company documents, and a survey instrument sent to the most senior finance executive in the firm (see Hellmann and Puri 2002) .
Of our 158 firms at risk of IPO or VC, 26 exit the risk set through IPO, acquisition, merger, or failure without securing VC, and another 14 do not receive VC by the end of 2000. Thus, 118 firms (71%) obtain VC funding and 87 (51%) go public during our sampling period. At first glance these numbers seem unusually high; however, the end of our time period (late 1990s) witnessed an explosion of VC investments and IPOs in entrepreneurial firms in the United States.
Independent and Control Variables
Our key independent variables are the founding team's functional experiences and initial functional structures. These measures are created like the dependent variables but focus on the team and functional structures at founding. That is, we code the breadth and depth of initial functional structure and founding team functional experience in each of the following six functional areas: sales and marketing, general administration (including human resources), science/R&D/engineering, operations, business development/strategic planning, and finance/accounting. At founding the mean number of unique functional positions, our measure of structure, is 1.8, which typically represents a firm with a general administrative position such as president or CEO and a vice president of science or engineering. The mean number of prior functional experiences at founding is 1.5.
Firm-Level Controls.
Firm size is the number of employees at the start of a calendar year, lagged by one year. Because of the skewed distribution of this measure, we use a logged measure in our analyses. We control for whether the firm had an innovation strategy, because strategy has been linked to VC financing in prior research (Burton et al. 2002) . We also control INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
for whether the firm sought to differentiate itself through its sales, marketing, or service, as this strategy implies a greater need for the sales and marketing function than other strategies. Initial strategy is coded from interviews with the founder and has been empirically validated (see Hellmann and Puri 2000) . For example, firms with innovation strategies are those that described themselves as "first movers." In addition, we control for the date the firm shipped its first product, because product shipment may affect the skills and structures required as well as firm outcomes. We also include the cumulative number of rounds of VC funding that the firm had obtained because such firms are more likely to go public (Gompers and Lerner 1999), but we obtain similar results when we use a simple dummy variable (e.g., equal to 1 when the firm obtains VC). Finally, we control for the amount of firm-level team data collected by including the average number of prior positions collected for each person in the firm. This allows us to control for the possibility that we have more data on individuals in successful firms.
Team-Level Controls. We include founding team size and then include measures for the cumulative entrances and exits to the TMT as controls. These variables capture both change and growth in the teams (Tushman and Rosenkopf 1996, Beckman et al. 2007) . A life-cycle perspective suggests that growth is the critical determinant of success, and these entrances and exits would be expected to wipe out any effects of origin. Further, these controls ensure that our effects for experience and structure are net effects of turnover. The proportion of TMT positions held by founders is included to control for the extent to which founders with executive titles are counted as part of both teams. All team variables are updated monthly.
Industry-Level Controls. Medical devices and the biotechnology industry (combined as medically related) is the only significantly different industry for our outcomes; thus, we include a dummy variable for this industry in all models. The number of IPOs in each industry by year controls for industry-specific variation in rates of IPO, and the number of VC deals by year controls for available financial resources.
Results
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the full sample are presented in the appendix. To examine the influence of the founding team's prior functional experience on the initial functional structure (H1), we conduct an event history analysis predicting time to the first executive-level position in a functional area using Cox proportional hazards models with the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of error and clustered by firm to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. We regress the time to the first position for five different functions on the prior functional experience of the founding team. The key independent variable is how many members of the founding team had prior experience in the function. (We exclude general administration because almost all firms start with a president or CEO.)
We report these results in Table 1 . For each functional area we generate a baseline model that includes control variables only and then a test model that adds a variable indicating the amount of relevant prior functional experience on the founding team. The number of exits indicates the number of firms that ever create an executive-level position in the function reported. During our observation period, 75% of the firms create a position in the science/engineering function (125 of 167); only half ever create an executive position responsible for manufacturing/operations (82 of 167), and fewer than one-fourth create an executive position in business development or strategic planning (42 of 167). Firms that have a function at founding-in other words, a member of the founding team creates the position-are censored immediately. Our models therefore capture the rate of functional position creation for those firms that do and that do not have the relevant prior functional experience. Table 1 reports hazard ratios and reveals that larger firms with larger founding teams, and those that obtain VC financing, create functional positions at a higher rate. For two of our five functional areas, science/engineering and sales/marketing, we find that having functional experience represented on the founding team significantly increases the rate at which the structural position is added to the TMT. Founding teams with sales experience are 69% more likely to add a sales position. Founding teams with science experience are 44% more likely to add a science position. The coefficients are in the predicted direction for both finance and strategic planning/business development, although they do not achieve statistical significance. Based on these results, we find modest support for H1.
To examine the relationships between initial functional experience and initial functional structure on subsequent team functional experience and later functional structures (H2, H3, and H4), we perform yearly panelpoisson regression analyses predicting counts of experience and structure for each function. We specify an AR1 error structure to account for serial autocorrelation and again report robust standard errors. These results are presented in Table 2 . Table 2 is organized into two panels with yearly teamlevel observations. The first panel presents our results for TMT functional structure. The second panel presents our results for TMT prior experience. The first six models in each panel represent each of the functional areas of interest and are counts of the depth or number of functional positions or experience in each area. The final model in each panel is a cumulative count variable that INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). ranges from 0 to 6 to capture the breadth of functional positions or experiences. We test our second hypothesis, that founding functional structure will be associated with subsequent functional structure, in the first panel. Across all specifications, there is a strong positive relationship between the founding structure and the subsequent structure, even controlling for whether the founding team has experience in a given functional area. Model 7 in Panel 1 presents the count variable predicting the number of functional positions eventually covered by the firm. Consistent with the results for each function, firms that begin with more initial structure are likely to cover more functional areas over time. Thus, while the founding team prior experiences shape initial structures (in modest support of H1 in Table 1) , it is these initial structures that shape subsequent structures (in strong support of H2 in Panel 1 of Table 2) .
We test the impact of initial structure and founding team prior experience on later TMT prior experience in Panel 2 of Table 2 (H3 and H4). Contrary to H3, initial functional structures do not serve as placeholders to facilitate bringing in later executives with relevant functional experience. Indeed, the only statistically significant finding (for sales/marketing positions) is the opposite of this prediction.
However, the pattern of results revealed in Panel 2 of Table 2 shows support for H4. There is a strong relationship between the functional background experience of the founding team and that of the later TMT prior experience, even controlling for changes in team composition. The relationship is consistently revealed for each of the functional areas (Models 1-6) and in the cumu- INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
lative count measure (Model 7). It is important to note that only the parallel structure or experience is predictive. In supplementary analyses we confirmed there were no effects for the noncorresponding functions. In other words, sales experience does not predict the establishment of a science position; it is only science experience that is significantly associated with science functional structures and subsequent science experience. We present the more parsimonious models in the paper for purposes of clarity. Across most specifications we see that large firms, and firms where teams are growing, have more broadly experienced TMTs and more functional positions. This suggests that firms are growing and becoming more experienced over time, which is consistent with a lifecycle perspective. Further, firms with VC funding often gain TMT experience and functional structures. However, our findings imply that structures and experiences accrue more to those firms that are already advantaged. Overall, our findings for structural precedent (we find support for H2 but not for H3) are weaker than our findings for cognitive framing (H1) and homophily (H4). Yet we see that initial functional structures matter (H2).
Finally, to test H5 regarding firm outcomes, in Table 3 we conduct event history analyses on monthly observations and report Cox proportional hazards models using maximum likelihood estimation and robust estimates of standard error (Lin and Wei 1989) . The founding year is represented as age = 0 with all the initial conditions represented as covariates that are updated where appropriate. Firms remain in the sample until they achieve the outcome of interest; until they cease to exist as independent entities through failure, merger, or acquisition; or until the end of the sample period, at which time they are censored.
We present our results in two panels in Table 3 to demonstrate the influence of founding team on the timing of two different outcomes: obtaining VC and completing an IPO. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes controls only. Note that team compositional changes are accounted for by the inclusion of measures of both entrances to and exits from the TMT. Model 2 examines founding team variables and includes count measures for both the amount of initial functional structure in the firm and the amount of prior functional experience possessed by the founders. In Model 3 we also include the interaction of these terms. The main effects are centered prior to calculating the interaction (as suggested by Cronbach 1987) to reduce collinearity between the main effects and the interaction term. Model 4 adds the same count variables and their interaction for the TMT team to assess whether the effects of the founding team are eliminated when the subsequent team is considered. It is in this model that we most strongly assess path dependence against life cycles in determining the relationship between team and firm characteristics and outcomes. As in Table 1 , we report hazard ratios, so numbers larger than 1 indicate an increase in the rate, and numbers smaller than 1 indicate a decrease in rate of achieving the firm outcomes.
In the first panel, the VC analysis, we see that firm size and the average amount of data collected for team members are both positively associated with attaining VC financing. In addition, TMT departures are positively related to obtaining financing. This may indicate that firms replace executives to build a team attractive to venture capitalists. In Model 2 we find that each additional functional area represented in the prefounding career history increases the likelihood of attracting VC financing by 14%. The effect of functional structure is also positive but not statistically significant. Interestingly, in Model 3, the interaction of structure and experience is negative and statistically significant. The interaction effect should be interpreted as the effect of experience on the outcome when structure is 0. The influence of founding functional experience on the time to VC financing is weaker for firms that begin with no functional structure; they have a 13% lower likelihood of receiving VC. Not surprisingly, the founding team effects are attenuated when we include characteristics of the subsequent team in Model 4 (although the interaction remains significant) because, as we know from Table 2 , founding team experience also predicts TMT experience. The strong correlation between the founding and TMT composition in the early years makes Model 4 difficult to interpret; however, the pattern of results suggest that the range of prior experience held by the founding team is an important correlate of VC financing, and firms that start with both experience and structure reach this milestone faster than other firms.
In Panel 2 of Table 3 we present a similar set of analyses for time to IPO. The control variables have larger effects on the rates of IPO. Firms in medical-related industries go public at least five times more quickly than firms in other industries, and firms in industries with a high number of IPOs go public more quickly than firms in other industries. In addition, we see that the effect of turnover has two countervailing effects on rates of IPO: firms benefit from entrances and are hindered by exits. These effects, while consistent with the life-cycle perspective, do not wipe out the founder effects, as seen in Model 2. Thus, origins do matter for outcomes. In contrast to our VC findings, Model 2 in Panel 2 reveals that functional structure is associated with an increased likelihood of IPO, and prior experience is not. In Model 3 we see that the interaction of structure and experience is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that structure cannot substitute for a lack of experience. The influence of founding functional structure on the time to IPO is weaker for firms that begin with no prior functional experience; they have a 23% lower likelihood of INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. Note. Robust standard errors. * Significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
going public. The effects of the founding structure persist through the inclusion of contemporary structure (see Model 4). Structure may be an important signal to public investors.
In general, our findings suggest that venture capitalists are more concerned with the prior experience of executives in firms that they fund, whereas the public markets evaluate functional structure. Both milestones are more easily achieved by the firms that start with both structure and experience. A key conclusion from the analyses in Table 3 is that although the impact of the TMT tends to be stronger than the founding team on these outcomes, founding team effects persist, controlling for changes to the team.
Supplementary Analyses
The above findings begin to establish organizational functional structure and incumbent prior functional experience as distinct constructs and demonstrate support for our main theoretical argument that initial con-INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). Notes. Two-tailed tests for F -statistic. We do not include comparisons between cells 2 and 3 and cells 2 and 4 because there are not significant differences. * p < 0 10; * * p < 0 05; * * * p < 0 01.
ditions constrain subsequent evolution. However, our hypothesis tests do not allow us to fully understand the interrelationships between structure and experience over time. The strong support for the effects of initial experience on subsequent experience and for the effects of initial structure on subsequent structure contrasted with the weaker or nonexistent support for the cross effects. This suggests that structure and experience are not substitutable. Having one does not appear to compensate for the other. To explore the interrelationships of structure, experience, and outcomes, we first descriptively characterize the team and firm evolutionary patterns revealed in our data (see Table 4 ). The first column (Full sample) presents overall means for all firms. We then divide our sample, using mean splits on counts of founding team functional experience and counts of initial structural positions, into four subsamples representing each of the archetype cells described in Figure 1 . Cell 1 most closely captures the mythical "engineers in a garage" as it describes a firm with a narrow range of functional positions and functional expertise. In contrast, Cell 4 most closely captures the professional team in a functional organization. The off-diagonals, Cells 2 and 3, represent situations where the founding team has either structure or experience, but not both.
Several points are noteworthy. First, Figure 1 and Table 4 demonstrate that experience and structure are clearly distinct concepts, and structure and prior experience do not always go hand-in-hand. The least common starting state is represented by Cell 2-simple structure, but broadly experienced executives-which characterizes 14 of 167 firms; however, firms are relatively dispersed across the other cells. Firms with neither structure nor experience at founding (50 of 167 firms represented in Cell 1) appear to be disadvantaged on many fronts: They start with smaller teams, do not grow as much, and are less likely to receive VC or to go public than firms with the most broadly experienced teams with complete structures. (See Table 4 , Rows 2, 6, 9, and 10.) Table 4 also lends additional support for H5, that the combination of initial background experience and functional structure is important for firm success. Firms in Cell 4 seem to achieve critical milestones more quickly 
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than firms in Cell 1. In addition, there is suggestive evidence that narrowly experienced teams are not able to accrue needed additional functional expertise as easily as unstructured teams acquire structure. That is, comparing narrowly and broadly experienced teams at each level of structure (Cells 1 and 2; Cells 3 and 4), it appears that, regardless of the starting structure, narrowly experienced founding teams have significantly less broad TMT experience at the end of the sample period (see Table 4 , Row 7). In contrast, when firms have broadly experienced teams, the firms that lack initial functional structures (Cell 2) have the same level of structure at the end of the time period as those that started with more complete functional structures (Cell 4) (see Table 4 , Row 8). Thus, those teams with early functional experience can develop functional structure, but those teams with early functional structure do not develop functional experience. Finally, it is worth noting that executives exit all types of firms at the same rate (see "Cumulative exits," Row 4 in Table 4 ). There are no significant differences across the four starting states, suggesting there is not a clear signal about "winning" firms.
In Table 5 we present monthly panel regression models, again correcting for autocorrelation and with robust standard errors, where we attempt to discern the relationship between origin state and ultimate destination. Given the evidence that successful firms have broadly experienced TMTs and complete functional structures, we are particularly interested in understanding the path by which firms end up in this state. Recall our count measures for breadth of experience and structure that range from 0 to 6. If we consider these as interval representations along two continua, then the product of experience and structure, an interaction variable with a theoretical range of 0 to 36, is a linear representation of the combined amount of structure and experience. The larger the product of TMT structure and TMT experience, the closer the firm is to having a complete structure and all functions represented in the prior experiences of the TMT (i.e., Cell 4). We treat this product as our dependent variable in a series of regression models where the key independent variables are initial structure, initial experience, and the interaction of the two.
In Table 5 , we report a baseline model, Model 1, with controls only. Models 2 and 3 add founder functional experience and initial functional structure, respectively, to the model. Model 4 includes both key independent variables. Model 5 includes the interaction of these two counts to assess the relative importance of each. This allows us to examine the extent to which experience and structure can serve as substitutes and whether one is more important than the other in influencing firm and team evolution. Consistent with life-cycle predictions of professionalization, firm size, VC, and entrances to the TMT are positively associated with having a broadly experienced team and complete structure, and TMT entrances is one of the largest effects in the model. Yet net of all of these effects, we see that founding team experience and initial structure are important correlates of the final destination state. Comparing Models 2 and 3, we see that founder functional experience alone improves model fit more than initial functional structure alone. Thus, it appears that initial experience is a more substantial predictor than initial structure. But Model 4 demonstrates a significant joint effect, and Model 5 reveals a slight positive interaction. This is evidence of the advantages associated with starting with both structure and experience (Cell 4) at founding; however, the strength of the experience main effect and the weak statistical significance attached to the interaction imply that Cell 2 is a better origin state than Cell 3.
We explored several alternative explanations of our findings. One additional explanation is that a match between initial and subsequent functional experience is created through preferences for experienced executives. Although all firms may seek to hire broadly experienced executives, it is only firms with broadly experienced founding team members that are able to attract the executive talent necessary for future success. Although similar to homophily, it would be a result of only broadly experienced founders being successful at recruitment. Although it is difficult to empirically disentangle these mechanisms, it is worth noting that all varieties of founding team experiences influence TMT experience, regardless of whether the experience is particularly relevant for the firm's strategy. This gives more credence to the homophily explanation.
Another alternative explanation is that "good" firms attract both broadly experienced founding teams and TMTs rather than founding teams predicting TMTs. This concern of unobserved heterogeneity is a common issue in empirical work, and we have done what we can to explore this possibility-that people are attracted to firms and not to other people. This would imply that rather than initial experience and structure increasing the ability of the firm to reach important milestones, experienced TMT members may be drawn to firms that look like winners. Thus, the causality could go the other way: Good firms attract good people rather than good people creating good firms. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we do control for several measures of firm quality. In addition to controlling for size and strategy, we are also including whether the firm had a product as a control. Also, recall that the exit rates and proportion of founders on the TMT across our four cells in Table 4 are not significantly different. On average, 1.7 executives leave the firm and founders account for more than 50% of the TMT. This suggests that firm quality is difficult to observe; otherwise, executives and founders would leave low-quality firms at higher rates. Thus, it seems likely that prospective TMT members have an easier time assessing the quality of the existing team than the Note. Robust standard errors. * Significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.
firm itself because the quality of the firm (independent of people) is hard to assess. However, there may also be an "escalation of commitment" (Staw 1976) , whereby subsequent team members remain with their firm despite lower potential returns. Of course, the entrance rates are significantly different across these cells. The founding teams with both experience and structure grow more rapidly than all other firms, but it appears these changes in composition are driven by founding team composition. Still, understanding how people evaluate prospective employment opportunities in entrepreneurial firms is an important area for future research. Because we were able to observe firms for a relatively short period of time, we are limited in our ability to assess if and when founder imprints might decay. In supplementary analyses we explore the extent to which our results are driven by having relatively young firms. We first replicated all our time-series analyses, including yearly dummy variables to control for the main effects of firm age and found results consistent with those reported. We also replicated the analyses in Table 2 , Model 7, predicting both TMT functional structure and TMT experience, including interactions with initial experience and structure and firm age. We find statistically significant age interactions; however, the magnitude of the effects is trivial. We thus have some confidence that our results hold for many years post-founding.
We were concerned about several additional factors that could have influenced our results. First, our effects may be skewed by the bubble market of the late 1990s. In supplementary analyses, we examine the possibility that our results arise from period effects rather than our theorized mechanisms. Our results are robust to restricting our VC financing events prior to 1993 (before the market began to heat up) and our IPO events prior to 1996 (the first year that IPO rates jump significantly). Organization Science 19(1), pp. 3-24, © 2008 INFORMS Firms may add positions to the TMT just prior to receiving external financing or going public to signal readiness to potential investors. We control for this potential "window dressing" by reporting team entrances and exits, and proportion founders on the TMT, lagged 12 months in all outcome analyses. Thus, changes made within a year of the event were not considered. We found substantially the same results with shorter and longer lags, thus we feel comfortable using a conservative oneyear window. However, because we have announcement dates and not dates when these discussions commenced, we cannot completely rule out reverse causality.
Finally, we were concerned that the time-series data may overemphasize the within-firm linkage between the founding team and TMT. In addition to using robust standard errors and correcting for autocorrelation in the reported models, we also ran a series of panel regressions. In these models we used founding team experience and structure to predict TMT experience and structure (as in Table 2 ) at a given firm age (e.g., at year 4 and at year 8), and we found similar results.
Limitations
We have taken a first step in understanding TMT evolution with rich longitudinal data. Of course, our study has several limitations. First, as noted above, we observe firms for a relatively short period of time and are thus limited in our ability to assess the durability of founder effects over long periods. A second weakness is that our data for both executives and firms are somewhat incomplete. We do not have the kind of detailed performance outcomes that are available for established public companies. In addition, we may have been unable to find data on TMT members who were not successful during their career. However, ours is the first study to our knowledge to attempt such a detailed look at the career histories of executives in small firms over time, and such an examination almost by definition involves problems with missing data. Furthermore, we have controlled for the potential problem to the extent possible in all analysis.
A third limitation is that our sample has a success bias because the firms survived on average five years before we contacted them. We believe, however, that in demonstrating an empirical phenomenon in an interesting empirical setting and establishing a new model of longitudinal research, the benefits of the sample far outweigh the concerns. Finally, there are questions of unobserved heterogeneity that cannot be ruled out, although we explore them to the extent possible in the above supplementary analyses.
Discussion
Our research demonstrates that founding teams strongly influence the TMT through path dependence. Consistent with homophily expectations, founding teams that begin with broadly experienced team members are more likely to attract broadly experienced executives. Consistent with ecological research, firms that begin with a range of functional structures are more likely to develop more complete functional structures. Thus, path dependence, where the founding team shapes the subsequent TMT, occurs through both homophily and imprinting.
We see cumulative advantage, as high-quality founding teams become high-quality TMTs and less wellendowed founding teams never catch up. In particular, we see that 26% of our teams begin with broad functional structures but narrowly experienced people (Table 4) , and they never catch up in terms of attracting a broad range of functional experience. Firms founded by narrowly experienced founders have difficulty attracting broadly experienced executives. It does not seem to be the case that narrowly experienced founders simply fail to recognize the importance of other types of functional expertise. Instead, even when the firm has created an executive level position for a given function-a strong statement that it needs and values that expertise-the firm is limited in its ability to fill the position with the relevant expertise if it does not already have an executive in place with at least some experience in that function. This suggests that structure is a poor substitute for experience. Thus, our results stand in sharp contrast to the dominant image of engineers in an unstructured nascent venture who are replaced by broadly experienced professionals who then formalize the structures and evolve the firm into a professional bureaucracy. Our results imply that the narrowly experienced "garage" entrepreneur is not likely to succeed (Audia and Rider 2005) .
Despite the significant findings, two of our hypotheses receive modest or no support. We find only modest support that initial functional experience predicts the initial functional structure. Given the wealth of other research documenting this transfer (Boeker 1988; Burton and Beckman 2007; Phillips 2002 Phillips , 2005 , it is possible that our measures of functional structure do not adequately capture the nuance of how executives enact organizational positions. In addition, path dependence may operate more strongly through homophily in the cases of race or gender (see Phillips 2005) . This would be a useful area for future research, as initial functional structure is an important decision that founders make.
Our lack of support for functional structures predicting experience (H3) is quite relevant for human resource management. At least in entrepreneurial firms, the structure of the position does not predict the experience people bring to the firm, once controlling for initial experience. Instead, it appears that the ASA framework (Schneider 1987) and structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984) together account for the relationship between early structure and experience and later structure and experience. As noted above, establishing positions and filling them with people who are "placeholders" appears to be detrimental to the firm's ability to ultimately attract broadly experienced executives.
Little research has examined changes in teams over time, much less from founding, and a major contribution of this paper is the detailing of the relationship between the founding team and TMT. We demonstrate that the founding team exerts an influence on the firm not only through directly influencing firm outcomes, but also by shaping the very nature of the organization. An ahistorical account of the TMT will overstate the ability of the TMT to change; in fact, future teams may be best understood by a detailed examination of the teams that have come before. This finding limits the role of agency and suggests sharp deviations from the initial path are unlikely (and probably risky, see Hannan et al. 2006) . Our research thus further highlights the benefits of an evolutionary perspective on firms and teams (see Aldrich 1999) .
We clearly see evidence of path dependence in our analysis, and these effects are net of changes and growth among the firms. The significant influence of team entrances in many of our analyses, however, also offers support for a life-cycle model of entrepreneurial firm development. Growth does allow firms to add both functional experience and structure, and these effects are substantive in our models. However, our intent here is to demonstrate that the initial conditions do matter and not all firms easily professionalize and grow. Particularly in light of our lack of support for H3-initial structure does not predict attracting that functional experience to the firm-firms should be cautious in assumptions of adding experience later. In contrast, our findings suggest deliberate planning into the future is usefully done at founding.
Our results also add to the organizational demography and upper echelon research, which has not to date focused on developing dynamic models or explaining the source of demographic distributions in organizations (Lawrence 1997 , Hambrick 2007 . Our work begins to address this weakness in the demographic approach by exploring the path-dependent process that results in continued heterogeneity or homogeneity among teams. This is not to say that organizational demography research has not moved in important directions. To the contrary, critical work examines the team processes generated by diversity (Knight et al. 1999 , Pelled et al. 1999 , Reagans and Zuckerman 2001 and the difficulties of using indirect measures of demographic composition rather than direct measures of social networks to predict firm performance (Reagans et al. 2004) . Still, scholars rarely conduct longitudinal studies (see Boone et al. 2004 and Sørensen 2004 for recent exceptions). More importantly, scholars have devoted little attention to the sources of demographic diversity. In addition, we point to a distinction between functional experience and functional structure that has received little attention in this literature; thus, our paper fills several important gaps in the literature.
For the entrepreneurial literature, our research suggests that the relevance of founding teams is more significant than has been acknowledged. Not only do founding teams directly impact firm outcomes, but, through a process of path dependence, the founding team shapes the TMT. Entrepreneurship research often focuses on the individual entrepreneur, but understanding the teams that come together and develop over time is essential to understanding the performance of entrepreneurial firms. We advocate more studies with longitudinal data as well as a focus on functional structure in addition to team human capital. Also important, but largely unexplored in this paper, is the impact of VC in shaping the TMT. Our findings offer suggestive evidence that VC-backed firms are better able to add structure and experience than non-VC-backed firms; however, the precise mechanisms are worthy of additional research.
Much more remains to be understood about entrepreneurial teams. How does a team attract founders with varied experiences when we know diversity is atypical (Ruef et al. 2003) ? Given the long-term effects of these initial choices, such an exploration would be very useful. We know founding is not truly the beginning, because entrepreneurs bring experience and networks with them (Burton et al. 2002, Shane and Stuart 2002) . A qualitative assessment of how people, ideas, experiences, and structures come together to create a firm would be an important contribution of future work. In addition, delving into individual executive positions in the organization would help us understand in more detail the mechanisms that result in path dependence .
Despite the remaining questions, we are encouraged by the consistency of our results, how they contribute to and reflect current theories, and by the potential rewards of examining teams over time in this rich research setting of entrepreneurial firms. We demonstrate that founding teams matter-both directly and indirectly-largely through a process of path dependence. This sociological and evolutionary approach demonstrates how initial teams have a lasting impact on the firm. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
